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Becoming child/ becoming dress
 Liz Jones
 Abstract
Taking an example of play as a point of departure I mark out why children’s bodies 
have  become  tricky  subjects  often  demanding  the  night  watchman  of  repression. 
Following Foucault (1977) and Butler (1990; 1993) I foreground the interrelationship 
between  desire,  the  lived  performances  of  bodies  and  the  sometimes  shattering 
consequences of those frames of containment in which we inscribe children including 
‘girl’  and ‘boy’.  The paper then moves to question whether Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(2004)  conceptualisations  of  ‘becoming’  offers  a  radical  means  for  dismantling 
manifestations  of  the  body and in  so  doing  provides  me  with  a  space  to  consider 
alternative practices in relation to children and their bodies. 
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Introduction
  Taking an example of data as a point of departure, this paper situates the child’s body 
as a key focus. Drawing on Foucault and Butler I summarise how discourses predispose 
children’s bodily enactments to be inclined towards some performances and not others. 
I  go  on  to  argue  that  whilst  both  theorists  call  into  question  the  idea  of  a  stable,  
normative  and  unified  body  there  is  still  more  work  to  be  done  to  eradicate  this 
particular fantasy. It is in relation to this work that I move to question whether Deleuze 
and  Guattari’s  (2004)  conceptualisations  of  ‘becoming’  has  radical  potential  for 
dismantling the body where alternative practices might become possible. 
    The paper pursues a number of pressing questions where I ask: can the concept of 
‘becoming’ help me to think beyond sterile distinctions and the routine ways in which 
the  child’s  body  is  marked  and  mapped?  Can  it  move  me  beyond  familiar  and 
reassuring  ways  of  knowing  children?  In  addressing  these  questions  I  draw  on  an 
example of data that is derived from an eighteen month ethnographic study that sought 
to understand how and why some children earn negative reputations such as ‘naughty’. 
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In this study we drew on a poststructuralist(s) analytical framework that allowed us to 
appreciate the ways and means by which children and their teachers were caught within 
the  discursive  practices  that  circulate  within  the  milieu  of  schooling,  where  what 
constitutes ‘good’ or conversely ‘bad’ behaviour is discursively produced (MacLure, 
2003, Brown and Jones, 2001). Three researchers spent one day a week in a reception 
classroom that are for children aged 4-5 years. Reception classrooms are the first stages 
of official and legal schooling in England. The researchers employed a mix of methods 
including filmed and written  observations,  interviews and informal  chats.  For fuller 
details, including detailed descriptions of the research sites and methods used please see 
MacLure et al., 2011.
The data
A group of  five-year-old children  are playing  in  an  area that  had been crudely but 
effectively constructed as a medieval castle. Lucy and four boys including Harley, his 
twin  brother  Sean,  Jonathan  and  Jack  were  in  the  castle.  Lucy  had  put  a  princess 
costume on and was directing the other children in terms of the roles she wanted them to 
play. “You can be the prince”, she says to Harley. Harley has picked up another princess 
costume and is putting the dress on. He has his back to the other children. “Look at 
Harley” says Jonathan. “He’s being a princess!” Lucy turns to look at Harley and then 
turns away to help Jack fasten the jester costume. “Right, you’re entertaining me with 
dancing” she says to Jack. “I’m not dancing. I’ll do some magic tricks,” responds Jack. 
Jonathan suddenly bursts into laughter. “Look at the girly Harley” he says, pointing at 
Harley. Harley is swirling around. Sean is watching quietly. Jonathan cries again, “Look 
at the girly Harley” pointing at Harley. Harley, still swirling, is holding the skirt out so 
that he seems to float across the castle. Sean is still watching quietly. Jack and Jonathan 
burst into loud laughter at Harley.
   It is this laughter that prompts an intervention from Ms Anderson. “That’s a little too 
much noise in the castle”, comes Ms Anderson’s voice from outside. The children do 
not  quieten,  but  continue  laughing  as  Harley  spins,  skips  and  flounces  around  in 
exaggerated ways. “Stop it,” says Sean. “I’ve asked you to settle down in there!” shouts 
Ms Anderson. “Sshh!” says Lucy, but Jonathan and Jack are beginning to force their 
laughter as Harley continues to perform as a princess. Ms Anderson comes over and 
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stands just outside the castle. “We’re trying to work hard over here Jonathan, and all 
this noise is distracting us. Do you think you could play a little more quietly?” “Ok”, 
says Lucy. Sean nods his head. Jonathan covers his mouth with both hands, trying to 
stifle his laughter. Harley starts to undo the princess costume and takes it off.
Writing about a castle, bodies and technologies: tricky positioning(s)
  First,  a confession.  I did not write the data. Another member of the project team 
documented it. Following Denzin (2003) I understand the use and the liberties that I am 
about to take with my colleague Rachel Holmes’ field-notes as ‘performative’. Hence, I 
am seeing the observation, where what was initially seen, sensed, and felt as continuing 
to intermingle with my own feelings and my own senses. As such, writing is always a 
method of inquiry (Richardson, 1994). 
   It is perhaps not too surprising that the paper turns initially to Foucault given the 
alignment of children’s play within a castle. In general, Foucault has highlighted how 
institutions including schools, prisons or, in this instance, a medieval castle, are neither 
benign nor innocent establishments. Rather, they are sites where what it means to be a 
man, or a woman, or a boy or a girl is produced within a range of discursive practices 
so  as  to  fabricate  or  construct  a  “regulatory  ideal”  (Butler,  1993,  p.  1).  From  a 
poststructualist  perspective(s),  “the  meanings  ascribed  to  bodies  are  culturally 
produced, plural and ever changing” (Weedon, 1999, p. 102). Discourses operate both 
at the level of language and within material structures where together they have serious 
implications in terms of shaping both bodies and minds. Rose (1998) expounds further:
Certain ways of holding oneself, walking, running, holding the head, 
and positioning the limbs are not merely culturally relative or acquired 
through gender socialization, but are regimes of the body that seek to 
subjectify in terms of a certain truth of gender, inscribing a particular 
relation to oneself in a corporal regime: prescribed, rationalized,  and 
taught in manuals of advice, etiquette, and manners, and enjoined by 
sanctions as well as seductions (p. 32).
  In brief, discourses define or shape whom we are, where we learn how to think and 
behave through regulatory discursive practices. Given this, it is not too surprising that 
Foucault (2006) urges us to be deeply skeptical and suspicious of discourses and that 
4
we should “criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always 
exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them” 
(Foucault, 2006, p.171 in  Chomsky & Foucault, 2006).  Turning to the children and 
their play it is possible to pinpoint two significant elements. The first is language and 
the second is the body. Let me first concentrate on language, knowing that the body 
will inevitably intrude. Then I will go on to discuss how I might ‘fight’.  
   If we follow the line that the ‘self’ is constituted within talk, where the stories and 
narratives we tell about ourselves and one another are significant and moreover, keep 
us  “in  good  repair”  (Shotter  and  Gergen,  1989,  p.  x)  it  then  becomes  possible  to 
perceive Lucy’s requests and orders as (perfectly)  intelligible.   Her own position as 
princess, within the specific domain of the castle constitutes a regime where Lucy’s 
command  is  “sayable”,  “hearable”  and  “operationable”  (Foucault,  1972,  p.  54). 
Positioned  as  princess,  it  becomes  (perfectly)  comprehensible  for  her  to  use  the 
properties  that  are  available,  including those  of  boy and costume so as  to  produce 
intelligible inhabitants and actions within a specific domain. It is suggested that Lucy, 
in  donning  a  princess  costume  and  in  wanting  Harley  to  become  a  prince  can 
potentially set in train meanings that are inscribed within power/knowledge relations, 
which  provide  the  basis  for  surveillance  and  regulative  (heterosexual)  practices. 
Augmenting  Harley,  as prince will  help to  establish the castle  as  a  “community of 
consent” where discursive boundaries will be drawn around what is both “intelligible” 
and  “desirable”  (Britzman,  2000,  p.  36).  The  paper  will  return  to  the  manner  of 
Harley’s ‘refusal’ subsequently. 
   By helping Jack to fashion himself as a jester and by uttering the following: “Right, 
you’re entertaining me with dancing” I gain a sense of Lucy’s own subjective security as 
necessarily bound up and implicated in the subject positioning of Jack and with relations 
of power and regulatory practices that are attendant with/in the subject of ‘jester’ and the 
acts of ‘entertaining’ and ‘dancing’. It is the latter which appears to act as a trigger on 
Jack where he refuses to dance and instead offers to “do some magic tricks”. So, whilst 
both children can agree on the subject positioning of jester, Jack nevertheless appears 
wary of being a dancing jester whose role is to entertain Lucy. By promoting himself as 
a jester who does tricks he both contests and effects an exit strategy from a subjectivity 
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(a dancing jester) that carries with it forms of being - which for him seem problematic - 
whilst at the same time retaining an intelligible semblance within the castle.
   As said, the work of a discourse makes certain subject positions comprehensible and 
by inference others incomprehensible. In the above data it is evident that whilst Lucy’s 
enactment  of a  princess  has been noted there  is,  particularly when compared to the 
language surrounding Harley’s performance,  an absence of emotive description.  It is 
suggested that this lack of description contributes towards hardening Lucy’s position as 
princess as ordinary, banal and predictable.  Within the make believe world of castles 
becoming a princess is what girls ‘normally’  do. Thus the text insinuates and makes 
‘natural’ Lucy’s performance and in so doing works at confirming (my) common sense 
notions about what girls can (and cannot) be. As Bruhm and Hurley (2004) note, who 
tells  the  story  matters  because  it  is  the  storyteller  including  in  this  instance  the 
ethnographic researcher who defines what can exist in the field of representation.  So 
how the data has been conveyed – who have been made visible, what language has been 
used and so on carries what Bruhm and Hurley refer to as “moral weight”, a weight 
which  in  classrooms  is  directed  towards  creating  the  normative  child  (Bruhm  and 
Hurley,  2004,  p.  x)  and in  medieval  castles  creates  what  is  customary or  the  ideal 
standard in terms of being a jester and or a princess. 
   Judith  Butler’s  work  (1990;  1993;  2006/2008),  however,  has  the  potential  for 
tampering  with  Lucy’s  performance  both  as  a  ‘girl’  and  as  a  ‘princess’  as  being 
normative. Butler (1993) insists that:
Gender is performative insofar as it is the effect of a regularity regime of 
gender differences in which genders are divided and hierarchized under 
constraint …There is no subject who precedes or enacts this repetition of 
norms (p. 237). 
    So, just as there is nothing ‘real’ about Lucy’s performance of the princess nor is 
there anything ‘real’ about her gender. Following Butler, Lucy’s performance (as girl 
and as princess) is so ordinary, so unremarkable because it’s predicated on a repeated 
stylisation that is enacted time and again within highly rigid regulatory frameworks 
whether  that  be an  imaginary  castle,  the  fairy tales  we tell  children,  Disney films, 
adverts  or,  as  suggested,  classrooms.  It  is  because  these  enactments  of  gendered 
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performances are so repetitive that they “congeal over time to produce the appearance 
of substance, of a natural sort of being” (Butler, 1990, p. 33). Within Butler’s terms 
Lucy’s  gestures  and her  acts  are  no  more  indicative  of  an  essentialist  or  universal 
notion of what constitutes a girl and/or a princess for both are a fabrication that has “no 
ontological status apart from its various acts which constitute its reality” (Butler, 1990: 
p. 336). The illusion that she creates when wearing the frock sits on yet another illusion 
where  the  latter  is  “discursively  maintained  for  the  purposes  of  the  regulation  of 
sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality” (Butler, 1990, p. 
337). 
    Yet, if it is accepted that Lucy performance is predicated on reiteration rather than 
ontological substance does that mean she has no agency? Within the confines of the 
castle, which arguably is a space that is representative of patriarchal power, Lucy does 
command.  Even  dressed in  that  most  potent  symbol  of  femininity,  a  pink  princess 
costume, she nevertheless does seem to have her say. However, Butler (1995) would 
argue  that  Lucy’s  commands,  her  utterances  and  her  ‘doings’  are  all  performative 
where performativity is defined thus:
  if a word ... might be said to ‘do’ a thing, then it appears that the word 
not  only  signifies  a  thing,  but  that  this  signification  will  also  be  an 
enactment of the thing. It seems here that the meaning of a performative 
act is to be found in this apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting 
(p. 198).
     So, for Butler Lucy’s agency does not ‘exist’ prior to its production through enacted  
discourse. Thus, her  ‘doings’ are constituted within already established formations of 
knowledge where  “the substantive  effect  of  gender  is  performatively  produced and 
compelled  by  the  regulatory  practices  of  gender  coherence”  (Butler,  1990,  p.  24). 
Lucy’s agency is caught within discourses where she helps to fasten a costume but 
where  she  nevertheless  cannot  get  a  boy to  entertain  her  with  dancing.  There  are 
reverberations here with Elisabeth Grosz’s work that is concerned with architecture and 
the body. For Grosz, who in turn was influenced by Luce Irigary (1993) ideas, ‘woman’ 
functions as a container  or place for ‘man’.   Lucy like ‘woman’ affords a place in 
which:
…man  can  situate  himself  as  subject,  which  means  she  represents  a 
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place that has no place, that has no place of its own but functions only as 
a place for another…the exchange: she gives him a world; he confines 
her in his (Grosz, 2001, p. 159).
    If, as Butler argues, performances are reiterative does this mean that Lucy and the 
other children can never be different, can never escape the enclosure of  (repetitive) 
normativity? Butler does suggest that there are radical possibilities, which lie within 
the notion of repetition. It is within repetition that agency becomes a possibility. She 
writes:
The subject is not determined by the rules by which it is generated because 
signification  is  not  a  founding  act,  but  rather  a  regulated  process  of  
repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through 
the production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all signification takes 
place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; “agency”, then, is to be 
located  within  the  possibility  of  a  variation  on  that  repetition  (author’s 
emphasis, Butler, 2005, p. 116).
   Within these terms agency becomes a possibility when coded scripts, binary logic 
and  taxonomical  structures  that  mark  out  and produce  relations  of  power  between 
girl/boy,  prince/princess  and  perhaps  jester/dancer  are  discarded,  or  ignored,  or 
replaced and in so doing individuals can experience themselves as different in spite of 
existing conventions. This is the moment or the juncture, as Butler (2004) describes it, 
when “ a subject – a person, a collective- asserts a right or entitlement to a livable life 
when no such prior authorization exists, when no clear enabling convention is in place” 
( 2004, p. 224). Despite and because of her capacity to designate (certain) roles Lucy’s 
performance is without radical potential but can the same be said of Harley? 
Becoming…
  Previously,  Judith Butler  offered a  frame,  predicated on performance in  which to 
situate the children and where I am left wondering whether repetition might carry some 
radical potency. My next step is to turn to Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari where I 
want to grapple with their concept of ‘becoming’ as a further move in destabilising and 
unsettling stable subjectivities that are codified, given substance and made rock-like by 
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common sense and by reiterative practices. I am aware of the theoretical differences 
between Butler and Deleuze and Guattari (Hickey-Moody and Rasmussen, 2009) and I 
am  not  attempting  to  synthesise  their  work.  Rather,  I  take  up  each  as  a  way  of 
supporting my own endeavours in thinking against the grain.  
   Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari also have an interest in repetition. Whilst Butler 
suggests that there are potential radical possibilities within the repetitive act of identity 
performance Deleuze argues that repetition is always difference. Deleuze (1994) draws 
a distinction between generality and repetition. So, in perceiving an object once and 
then seeing it again at a later juncture whilst we assert repetition of the same we are 
nevertheless making a judgement based on generality. Our common sense suggests that 
if it looks the same it is a repetition of the same. Protevi (2011), following Deleuze, 
indicates how retention and expectation give us faith that things will repeat in the ways 
we are used to. Thus past and future are “synthesised in a living present” (Protevi, 
2011,  p.  34)  and  it  is  this  synthesis,  which  “is  our  habit  of  life”  (2011,  p.  34). 
Perception, repetition and memory can offer stability yet besides being a questionable 
stability  it  also blocks  us  from recognizing  our  potential  for  seeing  differently.  As 
Colebrook (2002) notes, “… there is always more than the actual world; there are also 
all the potential worlds we might see” (p. 6). The question of how we shift ourselves so 
as to see “all the potential worlds” is embodied in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
‘becoming’, which as is subsequently illustrated is different to ‘being’. 
   In A Thousand Plateaus (2004) Deleuze and Guattari are quite firm in marking out 
what  is  (and is  not)  ‘becoming’.  They note,  for  instance,  that  a becoming is  not a 
correspondence  between  relations.  Nor  is  it  a  resemblance  or  an  imitation.  So  in 
returning to Lucy,  for example,  we can see her taking up of the role of princess as 
predicated on a set of comprehensible blocks (girl + castle + costume = princess). To 
see  this  ‘becoming’,  at  least  within  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  terms,  would  be 
unproductive. Lucy as princess makes common sense but it nevertheless “impoverishes 
the phenomenon [becoming] under study” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 262). 
   Thinking beyond or outside of customary logic necessitates rejecting linearity.  To 
achieve this daunting task Deleuze and Guattari  encourges us to think rhizomatically, 
where we have to fight the urge not to take root, or to look for causes along a linear line 
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where girl, dress, castle is predetermined to equal princess. As they note, “a rhizome 
ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, 
and  circumstances  relative  to  the  arts,  sciences  and social  struggles”  (Deleuze  and 
Guattari,  2004,  p.  8).  So,  thinking isn’t  about  establishing  end points;  rather,  it’s  a 
matter of getting stuck into the thick of things. 
   In turning to Harley I want to get into the thick of things. I want to put to one side the 
idea that  Harley is  imitating  or resembling  a  princess;  instead I  want to try to  pay 
attention to ‘stuff’ that is in between or in the midst of things. For if becoming is not  
resemblance,  imitation  or  identification,  what  is  it?   “To  become,”  writes  Deleuze 
(1997) is not:
       to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of  
proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one can no longer be 
distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule—neither imprecise 
nor  general,  but  unforeseen  and  non-preexistent,  singularized  out  of  a 
population rather than determined in a form (Deleuze, 1997, p. 1).
Deleuze  and  Guattari  illustrate  this  with  Hitchcock’s  film,  The  Birds.  They  write, 
“When  Hitchcock  does  birds,  he  does  not  reproduce  bird  calls,  he  produces  an 
electronic  sound  like  a  field  of  intensities  or  a  wave  of  vibrations,  a  continuous 
variation, like a terrible threat welling up inside of us” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 
336).  In  turning  back  to  Harley  I  begin  to  wonder  what  he  ‘does’  if  he  is  not 
reproducing princess, if he is not imitating a girl(y). Lingering once again on the data I 
feel myself  resonating with Harley’s body caught as it is in a dangerous dance that 
refuses to be stilled by sneers, laughter or taunts. Such stings and arrows are aimed at 
piercing and ridiculing, hell bent on (re)turning him to the same old, knowable Harley. 
One that is entombed within his unitary,  customary and familiar  self.  As he swirls, 
skips and flounces I read (and sense) his movements as an intensity that propels him to 
go  beyond  what  is  safe,  to  move  outside  of  prevalent  discourses  that  insist  on  a 
unfolding of the same. I hear, see and feel his breath labouring as he swirls and floats. 
And  yet  I  am still  haunted  by  representation  where  the  signifier  ‘dress’  acts  as  a 
placeholder, or if you will, a form of containment. Doesn’t dress = princess? Again I 
turn back to  Deleuze and Guattari  who remind me to resist  resemblance and to  be 
sensitive to influences. Bradotti (2002) continues the argument when she proffers the 
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advice  of  transcending  the  signifier  (i.e.  dress)  and  to  heed  “the  potency  of  [its] 
expression” (p. 119). Returning back to Deleuze and Guattari they would suggest that 
this “expression” gets its effectiveness and affectiveness from constant movement, lines 
of flight and molecular activity. Dress, children, castle, movement and I suggest, myself 
are  all  caught  within  an  assemblage  where  Harley  is  becoming  dress. Corrupting 
Deleuze and Guattari (but with good intentions) I ask what does becoming dress make 
possible? What are its functions with and in connection with other things? What does it 
transmit? What intensities does it induce or condone or negate? What vibrations are put 
in circulation which whilst indiscernible nevertheless have molecular affect producing 
reactions that I feel, like a sudden, (in)explicable gripping of the guts?
  
  Again I move to corrupt Deleuze and Guattari (please see the references to Little Hans 
in  A Thousand Plateaus,  pp.  282-84)  so as  to  edge towards  and feel  my way into 
becoming dress. I see Harley taken up in assemblage where the castle, the brotherly 
element, the boys’ friendships, the jester’s costume, the princess dress, the right to wear 
the dress, the right to dance wearing the dress, the joy of winning the right but also the 
dangers  of  winning  the  right,  the  shame,  the  teacher’s  angry  focus  on  work,  the 
muffling of toxic yet joyous laughter… These are not idle reveries. Rather, they are 
trembling, tentative but nevertheless serious considerations of thinking my way out of 
normative and habitual notions in relation to the self.
    Deleuze and Guattari (2004) make an interesting observation when they note that 
“there is no performed logical order to becomings and multiplicities, there are criteria 
and the important thing is they not be used after the fact, that they be applied in the 
course of events, that they be sufficient to guide us through the dangers” (p. 251). As 
Patricia MacCormack (2001) points out “becomings can be as liminal or as domestic as 
we  desire  based  on  the  potentials  of  our  own  being  to  expand  into  a  process  of 
hijacking the movement and rest, speed and slowness of that which we become” (p. 2). 
But this does not imply Harley has become half boy, half dress for this would mean that 
in a half and half state he would have forged an alliance between two singularities, 
keeping the signification  of  each.  Rather,  it  is  suggested  that  a  boundary has  been 
dissolved between boy and dress and in so doing the ontological categories that we 
would normally use to pin either Harley or the dress down are disrupted.  In seeing 
Harley as  becoming dress and the dress as  becoming Harley we can understand his 
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body as being outside the ‘conscious self’ or the ‘biologically determined self’; we can 
now understand becoming dress ‘through what it can do- its processes, performances, 
assemblages and the transformation of becoming’ (Springgay, 2008, p. 2, author’s own 
emphasis).  Becoming dress is not dependent on organisation or on an interior truth or 
identity; rather, it is an organic, (text)ured desiring machine that exists within the event. 
Within the context of the castle Becoming Dress connects, repels, galvanises. It invokes 
laughter,  disconcertion  and  anger.  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  indicate  (2004),  “all 
becomings  are  molecular:  the  animal,  flower,  or  stone  one  becomes  are  molecular 
collectivities, not molar subjects, objects, or form that we know from the outside and 
recognize from experience, through science, or by habit” (p. 303). Becoming dress can 
be understood as creation where molecular connections produce movement, speed and 
even floating. “Fibres” as Deleuze and Guattari note, “lead us from one to the other, 
transform one into the other as they pass through doors and thresholds” (p. 300) forging 
‘unnatural nuptials’ outside of the programmed body” (p. 302). I see my workings with 
Becoming  dress  as  a  door  or  threshold  that  allows  movement  away  from  those 
theoretical frames which seek to first ‘know’ children and second to tie or nail them 
into particular identities.  Becoming dress  allows me to think of the body outside of 
boundaries including that of anatomy. Working in the middle obliges me to see beyond 
usual or familiar scripts that circumscribe and represent children. 
Concluding remarks
   Working  with  Foucault,  Butler,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  I  have  tried  to  write 
performatvely, investing myself in the data as well as arguably infecting it. In moving 
between the two princesses, a jester, a silent twin and a cross teacher the aim has been 
to  worry  away  at  the  body.  In  so  doing  the  paper  has  illustrated  how  discourse, 
performance and organisation addresses, represents and acts upon self and body so as to 
produce normative, stable accounts of identity that are located within a bounded body. 
Thus even within a make believe medieval castle both children’s selves and their bodies 
are con(script)ed, codified and pressed into being where binary logic, common sense 
and habitual practices  leave children little choice but to be either a jester or a princess. 
   Yet by and through the peculiarities of Becoming dress I see possibilities for resisting 
standard  ways  of  behaving  and  performing.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  that  this 
standard,  which  they  describe  as  ‘majoritarian’  is  predicated  on  power.  Thus 
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majoritarian and its opposite, minoritarian  are not understood in the numerical sense, 
but rather through their positions in power relations. Thus if Harley, for example, had 
taken on the role of prince there would have been no challenge to or interruption of ‘the 
standard’.  As  Beaulieu (2011) notes,  “there is  no becoming-man as the male is the 
majoritarian standard and becomings can only be minoritarian” (p. 76). Both ‘becoming 
princess’ and ‘becoming dress’ can be understood as a minoritarian because each can 
be understood as the negative other to the majoritarian standard. It is possible I think to 
see  why  Deleuze  and  Guattari  ascribe  a  political  value  to  the  experimentation  of 
becomings. The latter always constitutes a deviation from majoritarian power. 
   One final thought. Whilst the medieval castle is a temporary structure fashioned out 
of relatively flimsy cardboard it is nevertheless quite adequate in fortifying a number of 
habitual  and  normative  practices.  Whilst  it  is  noticeable  that  these  performances 
emanate from scripts predicated on reiterative and repetitive performance I nevertheless 
think that I did catch a glimpse of becoming. It would appear that currently Sean and 
Jonathan are unable to “make new and strange connections…but rather fulfil a certain 
form  of  subjectivity  fixed  in  space”  (MacCormack,  2001,  p.  2).  However  as 
MacCormack continues, “one is never safe in a dominant position but must re-establish 
the rules of dominance while fulfilling the expected subjectivity of these rules” (my 
emphasis, p. 33). And, whilst cautious, I nevertheless understand the statement “one is 
never  safe” as heralding possibilities  for cutting into what  is  still  the yard  stick by 
which subjectivity is appraised - ‘the white heterosexual male’ - and against which the 
non-white and the non-heterosexual individual is aligned and negatively construed.   
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